Fig. 1. Han Shih-chang, elected President of the Chinese Republic, September 4, 1918.

PREFACE

After the war, the attention of the world will more and more shift to China and the Far East. The greatest potential market of the world lies there: the greatest need for industrial and economic development is there. The Far East, in general, and China, in particular, have been profoundly affected by the war: they will be even more deeply influenced during the peace which is to follow. All of the great powers have financial interests in China; after the war, these interests will come into sharp competition and rivalry. In their relations with China and with each other, the nations will face two alternatives: on the one hand, a policy leading to an imperialism and oppression which eventually will endanger the dearly-bought world-peace; on the other, a course of action based on international justice and the development of a democracy in the Far East that will be safe for the world. These alternatives in Asia are, and will be, the same as those which the world is facing in Europe today: the writer believes they should be viewed in the light of the principles for which the larger part of mankind is now fighting and that unless this is done, on the Eastern horizon will surely gather the dark clouds of another world-storm.

In this volume accordingly, the author --- who has lived in China for the past three years --- has tried to trace the more recent development of this largest of the Asiatic nations, indicating some of the problems which it is now facing, especially as they appear against the background of the world-war, and attempting to point out some of the ultimate issues to which these problems, if they remain unsolved, will lead. To these issues the world at large cannot remain indifferent; and the attempt has been made in this volume to present as fairly and clearly as possible the facts of the present trans-Pacific situation. Throughout the volume, quotations have been made from original documents and statements of the press, in order to avoid, as far as possible, any subjective coloring of the facts. Further, in the interests of international harmony and good-will, the more extreme and less characteristic utterances of the press and of publicists of the nations involved, have been omitted. To this situation in the Far East, it is hoped that the standards and ideals formulated by the free peoples of the world will be applied; and the writer believes that in the application of these standards and ideals will be found a solution --- and the only solution --- of problems which are of momentous consequence for the rest of the world.

The author desires to express his grateful obligation to Professor F. Wells Williams, of Yale University, and to Dr. John E. Williams, Vice-President of Nanking University, who have given helpful advice, and made valuable criticisms of the manuscript. To the Peking Gazette, formerly under the able editorship of Mr. Eugene Chen, the author is indebted for many excerpts from contemporaneous documents and articles of value. Acknowledgment is made of the permission of D. Appleton & Co. to use the summary of Treaties Concerning the Integrity of China and Korea, and The Maintenance of the Open Door which appears in Dr. Hornbeck's volume, Contemporary Politics in the Far East; and the permission of Dodd, Mead & Co. for the use of the translation of The Memorandum of the Black Dragon Society, contained in Mr. Putnam-Weale's book, The Fight for the Republic in China. Some of the material in this book was originally published in the Current History Magazine of the New York Times, and in the Evening Telegram of Portland, Oregon; acknowledgment is made of the courteous permission of the publishers to use this in the present volume. In the absence of the author in China, Dr. D. Johnson Fleming has kindly consented to supervise the publication of the book and for his willingness to undertake this task the writer is grateful.

In conclusion, the author wishes to express his appreciation of the services of Miss G. D. O'Neill and her co-workers, of Pasadena, in preparing the manuscript for the press, and his gratitude for the courtesies of his publishers.

Westmoreland Place, Pasadena, California, October 1, 1918.

Chapter One

CHAPTER I

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC FROM WITHOUT, DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR. JAPAN'S CAPTURE OF TSINGTAO AND THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

The Great War first burst forth in Europe, but its effects were felt at once on the opposite side of the globe. These effects were both immediate and far-reaching. Momentous as were the results of the first year of the war in Europe, they were equally significant in Asia, and the making of the new map of the Orient was one of the most important features of the first stage of the great conflict.

On August 1, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia and France; just two weeks later Japan sent an ultimatum to Germany, demanding its complete withdrawal from its possessions in the Pacific. On August 23rd, Japan declared war; within three months, Tsingtao , the Oriental stronghold, of the Germans, with the co-operation of a small British force, was captured, and the Japanese were installed in Germany's place in the province of Shantung. Two months later, Japan presented a series of demands on China, divided into five groups, the acceptance of which would have placed China definitely in the position of a vassal state. After less than four months of negotiations, on May 8, 1915, China accepted four groups of these demands, leaving the fifth open for future discussion. Thus, in the first nine months of the first year of the Great War, Germany's political and military power were eliminated in the Orient; Japan had taken over its possessions in China; and China had been forced to concede to Japan extensive territorial rights, economic privileges, and military concessions of great strategic importance. Thus the ante-bellum situation in the Far East was entirely altered, and new problems of international policy and relations were created. The spark struck at Sarajevo had, indeed, kindled a world-wide flame; Europe and Asia, the Occident and the Orient, alike were to feel its transforming force.

In order fully to comprehend the action of both China and Japan during this period, an understanding of their development and international position is necessary. The summer of 1914 found China still in the throes of the attempt to gain political stability within its own boundaries; to make its newly founded republic a stable reality. Less than three years before, on October 10, 1911, a revolution against the existing Manchu dynasty had broken out; on February 12, 1912, the Manchus signed their Edict of Abdication. A republican form of government had already been set up at Nanking, with Doctor Sun Yat-sen as Provisional President; when the Manchus abdicated, Dr. Sun voluntarily gave place to Yuan Shih-kai, who became the first President of the Chinese Republic. A provisional constitution was adopted and Peking was chosen as the capital. Elections to the new National Assembly were held in the following winter and the two houses met in Peking in April, 1913. Ever since the establishment of the Republic, two clearly recognized parties had been in existence; one composed of the Radicals and the Liberals, made up chiefly of Southerners, with Dr. Sun as their leader; the other consisting of Conservatives and the Military Party who supported Yuan. The writing of the Provisional Constitution had been done by the Southerners; it limited the power of the President and gave Parliament a large measure of authority. The majority of the first Parliament were Radicals. There was much friction between Yuan and the Assembly; it was increased by Yuan's signing, without the consent of Parliament, a loan with the bankers of the Five Powers, including Japan, the United States having withdrawn; by Yuan's expulsion of various Southerners from office; and by the assassination of one of their prominent leaders(1) in Shanghai, Yuan's government being charged by many Southerners with his murder. Finally the President's command to the Military Governor of one of the Southern provinces to give up his office, together with the sending of Northern troops to enforce the order, brought on armed resistance and the rebellion of the summer of 1913. Nanking was captured by the Northern troops and the rebellion collapsed. Dr. Sun Yat-sen and many of his associates fled to Japan. In October the Assembly passed the laws which provided for the election of the President. On October 6th, Yuan Shih-kai was elected President by the two Assemblies for a term of five years; and on the next day, Li Yuan-hung was elected Vice-President. The United States and several South American republics had already recognized the Chinese Republic; now the European Powers and Japan did the same. Thus the Republic acquired a recognized international status.

But the drafting of the new constitution was accompanied by more friction, and finally, on November 4th, Yuan purged the Parliament by expelling the Radical members; the National Assembly was dissolved and an Administrative Council was formed in its place. On May 1, 1914, a constitution designated as the Constitutional Compact, which had been drawn up by a conference organized in March, was promulgated. Professor F. J. Goodnow, of Columbia University, who had been appointed Constitutional Adviser, had a large influence in forming this instrument. This constitution gave large powers to the President, granting him practically an absolute veto-power and the right to re-election after a term of ten years. It provided for a One-chamber Parliament. After drawing it up, the Constitutional Compact Conference worked out provisions for a Council of State with the vice-president as speaker, which would act as a legislative body until a new assembly could be elected. This Council of State began its work on June 30, 1914. It had before it the amendment of the laws governing the presidential elections, to make them conform to the new compact; and the laws concerning the formation of the new Parliament.

This, then, was the situation in China at the outbreak of the Great War. From her own viewpoint, her problems were almost entirely internal; her whole mind was bent on the task of building up a republic in place of the old empire. She faced enormous difficulties in the lack of a system of universal education, of adequate transportation facilities, of modern means of industrial production and manufacture, and of any general development of her natural resources. She had to adjust her meagre finances to the pressure and demands of a government of the twentieth century, and she seemed to be tending toward an autocratic government under the guise of a republic. She had little energy to spare for new foreign relations and, when the war broke out, as a matter of course, she at once announced her neutrality.

There was some hope that Chinese territory would not be involved in the military operations of the conflict; but the ultimatum of Japan to Germany on August 15th at once brought the war to China's doors. Japan, in sending this ultimatum, avowedly acted as the ally of Great Britain. The rise of Japan in power and international prestige had been meteoric. In comparatively few years she had broken away from her seclusion; had set up a monarchy in place of a feudal state; and had definitely turned her face toward progress and reform. In this step she was a full generation in advance of China, from which country she had originally drawn her written language, her arts, and much of her civilization. As a result of two victorious wars she had sprung into the front-rank of world powers. In 1895 she had won Formosa and the neighbouring Pescadores Islands from China; Korea had been made independent, and the Liaotung Peninsula, including Port Arthur, had been ceded to Japan. This last territory Japan was forced to return to China on representations of Russia, Germany and France; but in 1905, after the victory over Russia, Port Arthur and the Russian railways and privileges in that section were finally won. All Russia's concessions and powers in Southern Manchuria were given to Japan, and her paramount interests were recognized in Korea. In 1910, Korea was formally annexed. In 1911, at the time of the Chinese revolution against the Manchus, Mongolia became virtually independent, and Japan began to turn her attention to the eastern and inner portions of that province which bordered the Japanese possessions in Southern Manchuria.

In the meantime in Europe, friendly relations were being built up between Great Britain, France and Russia; their community of interests was evident at Algeciras and in Persia. Japan was admitted into this friendship first in 1902, by the formation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which was revised and extended in 1905 and 1911: and, in 1907, in the agreement between France and Japan regarding Far-Eastern affairs, which paved the way for a reconciliation with France's ally, Russia. In 1909, the United States suggested in the interests of the open-door that the Manchurian railways be neutralized but, as an answer, in July, 1910, Russia and Japan entered into an agreement to preserve the status quo(2) without compliance with the American request. Thus in two decades the Japanese Empire had risen to a place of equality among the great nations, and it had gained the power to adapt and enforce her own foreign policy in the world-turmoil produced by the Great War.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance contained the following stipulations:

"If by reason of an unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, either of the High Contracting Powers should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests, . . . the other High Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally and will conduct the war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with it."

When Japan accordingly mobilized its army and its fleet and, on August 15th, sent its ultimatum to Germany, its demands were two-fold:

"First,--- to withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those that cannot be withdrawn.

"Second,--- To deliver on a date not later than September 15th to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochow, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China."

A reply within a week was demanded and, none being received, Japan declared war.

Considerable uneasiness was evident in the Orient concerning Japan's ultimate intentions, and several statements were made by Japanese statesmen to allay these suspicions. Thus on the day Japan's ultimatum was delivered to Germany, Count Okuma, the Premier, sent a telegram to the press in America, saying: "Japan's proximity to China breeds many absurd rumours; but I declare that Japan acts with a clear conscience in conformity with justice, and in perfect accord with her Ally. Japan has no territorial ambitions and hopes to stand as the protector of the peace in the Orient." Again, in August 24th, he telegraphed a message to The Independent (New York), saying in part: "As Premier of Japan, I have stated and I now again state to the people of America and of the world that Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or other peoples of anything which they now possess. My government and my people have given their pledge, which will be as honourably kept as Japan always keeps promises."

On September 2, Japanese troops were landed on the coast of Shantung Province from where they marched overland to Tsingtao. China's fears concerning the possibility of its neutrality being violated seemed justified, as the Japanese army took possession of various towns and cities in the interior, as well as the railroad to the provincial capital; assumed control of the means of communication; and made requisitions upon the Chinese population. A small force of British troops were landed inside the German leased territory and co-operated nominally in the siege of Tsingtao. On November 16, the city surrendered and the German military and naval power in the Far East was eliminated.

Japan now had an opportunity to survey the world situation as affected by the war and to orient itself in relation to it. By the end of 1914 it was apparent that the war would not end quickly: momentous changes in national alignments were in progress; and an unequalled opportunity seemed to present itself in Japan for satisfying various territorial and economic ambitions. As later events demonstrated, these ambitions and aims were five in number. First, to succeed Germany in its position and possessions in Shantung; second, to consolidate the Manchurian territory won in the war with Russia and to add to it a part of Mongolia; third, to gain a controlling share in the iron output of China; fourth, to secure the military safety of Japan by rendering impossible the lease of any of China's ports or coastal islands; fifth, if possible, to enter into such close economic, military and political relations with China, as to make it, with all its vast resources, tributary to Japan. These five aims were expressed in the Twenty-one Demands served on China on January 18, 1915.

The review of these demands by any true friend of Japan is not a pleasant task. It is only fair to say that the liberal-minded statesmen of the Empire, because of the international suspicion aroused, look upon these demands with regret. Every friend of Japan and China hopes that the agreements will be reviewed at the final Peace Conference in the light of the principles for which the Allies are fighting.

Before the demands were presented to China there were various rumours current concerning them. Many Japanese statements were made advocating a more aggressive policy towards China. Perhaps the most important of these was a secret memorandum of the Black Dragon Society (so-named from its connection with the "Black Dragon" province of Manchuria).(3) This statement was by chance disclosed some months after the serving of the Twenty-one Demands. After outlining the world's situation as it affected China and Japan, it emphasized the necessity of solving the Chinese question at once and of forming a defensive military alliance with China, and named most of the objectives which were sought later in the Japanese Demands. It also contained a surprisingly accurate forecast of Japanese foreign policy as a result of the war.

Fig. 2 . An Outpost of Tsingtao, the German Stronghold in China. The white buildings in the centre are the German barracks; fortifications and guns are concealed in the hills in the background. Tsingtao was captrured by Japanese and British troops on Nov. 16, 1914.

As already indicated in the ultimatum to Germany and in Count Okuma's message to America, Japan had made statements concerning the return of Kiaochow and concerning any attempt to secure more territory or privileges from China. But a change of mind was indicated in December by certain statements made in the Japanese Parliament by Baron Kato, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Having been asked if Kiaochow would be returned to China, he stated that the question regarding its future was at present unanswerable, and further that Japan had never committed herself to return Kiaochow to China. This changed attitude was revealed again in the ultimatum which Japan presented to China in May to force acceptance of the Twenty-one Demands. In this ultimatum Japan used the non-restoration of Kiaochow as a weapon with which to coerce China into an acceptance of the Demands. In the ultimatum, she said in part, "From the commercial and military points of view, Kiaochow is an important place, in the acquisition of which the Japanese Empire sacrificed much blood and money, and after its acquisition, the Empire incurs no obligation to restore it to China." Then, in an accompanying note, she added: "If the Chinese Government accepts all the articles as demanded in the ultimatum, the offer of the Japanese Government to restore Kiaochow to China, made on the twenty-sixth of April, will still hold good." In other words, Japan was holding Kiaochow as a pawn to bargain with, and would continue to hold this territory, unless her other demands were satisfied.

The entire group of requests concerning Shantung, as contained in Group I of the original Twenty-one Demands, was as follows:

GROUP I

"Art. I. The Chinese Government engages to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the rights of the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions, which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

"Art. 2. The Chinese Government engages that within the Province of Shantung and along its coast no territory or island will be ceded or leased to a third Power under any pretext.

"Art. 3. The Chinese Government consents to Japan's building a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to join the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu railway.

"Art. 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the interest of trade and for the residence Of foreigners, to open by herself as soon as possible certain important cities and towns in the Province of Shantung as Commercial Ports. What places shall be opened are to be jointly decided upon in a separate agreement."

The second group of demands dealt with the Japanese sphere in Manchuria and Mongolia. As the result of the war with Russia, Japan had secured a twenty-five year lease on Port Arthur and control of the neighbouring railways and Russia's rights in Southern Manchuria. She was looking with longing eyes towards Eastern Inner Mongolia, but as yet had no rights there. Now, in a preamble to this second group, Japan stated that the "Chinese Government has always acknowledged the special position enjoyed by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia," and demanded a ninety-nine year lease of Port Arthur and the important railways of that region; and privileges of trade and mining and residence in both Manchuria and Mongolia alike. These privileges went far beyond any granted in other provinces of China. They practically transformed Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia into Japanese dependencies. The detailed Demands were:

GROUP II

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, since the Chinese Government has always acknowledged the special position enjoyed by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:

"Art. 1. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term of lease of the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to the period of 99 years.

"Art. 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia shall have the right to lease or own land required either for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for farming.

"Art. 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and to engage in business and in manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

"Art. 4. The Chinese Government agrees to grant to Japanese subjects the right of opening the mines in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. As regards what mines are to be opened, they shall be decided upon jointly.

"Art. 5. The Chinese Government agrees that in respect of the (two) cases mentioned herein below the Japanese Government's consent shall be first obtained before action is taken:

"(a) Whenever permission is granted to the subject of a third Power to build a railway or to make a loan with a third Power for the purpose of building a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

"(b) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third power pledging the local taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia as security.

"Art. 6. The Chinese Government agrees that if the Chinese Government employs political, financial or military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Japanese Government shall first be consulted.

"Art. 7. The Chinese Government agrees that the control and management of the Kirin-Changchun Railway shall be handed over to the Japanese Government for a term of 99 years dating from the signing of this Agreement."

Japan has not a sufficient supply of iron ore; China is rich in this mineral; and the solution was obvious. In Group III the largest iron company in China was to be made a joint concern, and the future mining operations of the Yangtze Valley were to be placed within Japanese control. The Agreement read:

GROUP III

"The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, seeing that Japanese financiers and the Han-yehping Co. have close relations with each other at present and desiring that the common interests of the two nations shall be advanced, agree to the following articles: --

"Art. I. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations and they further agree that without the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by her own act dispose of the rights and property of whatsoever nature of the said Company nor cause the said Company to dispose freely of the same.

"Art. 2. The Chinese Government agrees that all mines in the neighbourhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company shall not be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by other persons outside of the said Company; and further agrees that if it is desired to carry out any undertaking which, it is apprehended, may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the said Company, the consent of the said Company shall first be obtained."

Group IV involved Japanese control over Chinese coasts, which would ward off any future military measure by another Power. It read:

GROUP IV

"The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China agree to the following special articles: --

"The Chinese Government engages not to cede or lease to a third Power any harbour or bay or island along the coast of China."

But the real extent of the Japanese ambitions was revealed in Group V. A new sphere --- Fukien ---was named, and the right to build strategic railways from the coast up the Yangtse River Valley was requested. In addition, China was to employ Japanese advisers in political, financial and military affairs; police-courts in important cities were to be jointly administered; China's arsenals and war munitions were to be controlled by Japan. These demands, if granted, would have put China definitely in the position of a vassal state of Japan. They were practically the same as the terms forced upon Korea before its annexation. In detail they were:

GROUP V

"Art. I. The Chinese Central Government shall employ influential Japanese advisers in political, financial and military affairs.

"Art. 2. Japanese hospitals, churches and schools in the interior of China shall be granted the right of owning land.

"Art, 3. Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and Chinese police to settle, cases which caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese or that the police departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese Police Service.

"Art. 4. China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50% or more) of what is needed by the Chinese Government; or that there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly-worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased.

"Art 5. China agrees to grant to Japan the right of constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, another line between Nanchang and Hangchow, and another between Nanchang and Chaochou.

"Art. 6. If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build railways and construct harbour-works (including dock-yards) in the Provinces of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted.

"Art. 7. China agrees that Japanese subjects shall have the right of missionary propaganda in China."(4)

These Twenty-one Demands were rather curiously prefaced by the statement: "The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the good neighbourhood between the two nations, agree to the following." They were presented by the Japanese Minister directly to the President, Yuan Shih-kai. The utmost secrecy was maintained and, when rumours became current, the Japanese Government officially denied their existence. A month later, it issued a statement listing only eleven demands, Group V and the more objectional requests being omitted. On April 26th, in place of the original Twenty-one Demands, twenty-four were presented with slightly different wording. On May 7, an ultimatum was sent by Japan, demanding the immediate acceptance of the first four groups and threatening force if a favourable answer was not received. The fifth group was to be held over for future negotiations.

On May 8, China submitted, at the same time affirming in a supplementary statement that it was forced to take this step and that it would not be responsible for any consequent infringements upon the treaty rights of other nations or the principle of the "Open Door."

The conclusion of these negotiations marked the winning by Japan of most of its original objectives. The hope of making China entirely subservient had not been realized, but Japan's power over the Republic had been enormously increased and the acquiring of final control seemed only a matter of time. The situation was summed up by Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, a leading authority on Far Eastern affairs, as follows:

"Whatever her intentions, Japan has accomplished in regard to China at least five things: she has consolidated her own position in her northern sphere of influence, Manchuria; she has driven the Germans out of their former sphere of influence, Shantung, and has constituted herself successor to Germany's rights; she has given warning that she considers Fukien Province an exclusive sphere for Japanese influence; she has undertaken to invade the British sphere of influence; and she stands in a position to menace and to dictate to the Peking government. A glance at the map of North China will show how completely Peking is at Japan's mercy. In control of Port Arthur and of the Shantung Peninsula, Japan commands the entrance to the Gulf of Pechili, which is the doorway by sea to Tien-tsin and Newchwang. In possession of Tsingtao, Dairen, and (virtually) of Antung and Newchwang, Japan thus commands every important port and harbour of the Yangtse. With the Manchurian railways penetrating the heart of Manchuria and the Shantung Railway extending to the heart of Shantung--- and with the right to extend the latter line to join the Peking-Hankow line --- Japan is in a position, should she so choose, at any moment to grind Peking between the millstones of her military machine. So far as strategy is concerned, Japan has North China commercially, militarily, and politically at her mercy." (5)

The interest aroused among the nations by these negotiations was, of course, keen, and the matter attracted world-wide publicity. The United States was the only great power not involved in the war in Europe, and it was perhaps natural that it should be the one country openly to voice a protest against the settlement. On May 16 she delivered the following note to the Chinese Government at Peking and to the Japanese Government at Tokyo:

"In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place or which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and the agreements which have been reached and as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honour to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into, or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy, commonly known as the open door policy."

Thus the first year of the Great War brought changes of the most vital importance to the Orient. Whether or not these changes shall become permanent can be decided only at the conference which will come at the close of the world-conflict.

CHAPTER II

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC FROM WITHIN, DURING THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR. THE ATTEMPT OF YUAN SHIH-KAI TO RESTORE THE MONARCHY.

The first year of the war brought vital changes in China's foreign relations, especially in those with Japan. The second year saw changes within the country of almost as great importance.

These changes, in their ultimate result, were in line with the world tendencies of the present time toward democracy and popular government. Writing in August, 1916, to the New York Times, the author tried to sum up the events of the preceding months, saying in part:

"If it were not for the all-absorbing cataclysm in Europe, all eyes would be turned toward the Orient and the great movements now in evidence there. Certainly the developments in India and Japan since the Great War began are of vast importance in the moulding of the future of Asia. But it is in China, especially during the past year, that events of unique interest have taken place. The sudden clamour for the .change of the infant republic into a monarchy, which began last fall; the continued agitation for this transformation in the form of government, culminating on Dec. 11 in the unanimous vote of the Convention of Representatives of the Citizens for a Monarchy, with Yuan Shih-kai at its head; the gradual appearance of a most serious opposition, resulting in the revolt of the southern provinces; the sudden cancellation of the monarchial project by Yuan Shih-kai on March 22; the effort to oust Yuan as President, ending dramatically with his death on June 6, and the election of Li Yuan-hung as President in his stead; --- these are a few of the main events in a most absorbing, hard-won fight between democracy and autocracy in the Far East. . . . In this fight for the republic in China, America should have a very real interest and sympathy."

The summer of 1915 found China just recovering from the shock of the Japanese aggressions; in retaliation, the country was entering upon a nation-wide boycott of Japanese goods and productions. Attempts were being made to raise a National Salvation Fund to be applied toward strengthening the nation in every possible way. The gifts toward this latter cause were from all classes; one ricksha coolie in a certain city was said to have given to the fund forty Mexican dollars, the saving of his entire lifetime.

Ever since the dissolution of Parliament in November, 1913, Yuan Shih-kai had been moving toward a centralized government, with the power in the hands of a few of his lieutenants. There were open suggestions of a return to a monarchy. The Japanese demands hastened this entire movement. In support of a return to the monarchy the arguments were in the main three: first, that a monarchy, and one of militaristic tendencies, was stronger than a Republic. Germany and Japan were cited as examples. Second, that at the close of the war, if there were not a strong government---if the right of succession were not clear---and if civil strife, which seemed common in a Republic, continued; --- the other nations would step in and take control of China and would put a ruler of their own choosing on the throne, just as Japan had done in Korea before its annexation. A third reason was the wish of the eldest son of Yuan Shih-kai to succeed his father as Emperor.

Shortly after the Japanese ultimatum in May, the Chou An Hui (Society for the Preservation of Peace) was organized with the purpose of spreading propaganda in support of the monarchical idea. A pamphlet by a scholar called Yang Tu was circulated in August, giving the reasons for the proposed change. It was entitled "A Defence of the Monarchical Movement," and was in the form of a dialogue between a stranger and a citizen of the Republic. Three excerpts will be sufficient to exhibit its type of reasoning.

"The people of a republic are accustomed to listen to the talk of equality and freedom which must effect the political and more especially the military administration. . . . But the German and Japanese troops observe strict discipline, and obey the orders of their chiefs. That is why they are regarded as the best soldiers in the world. France and America are in a different position. They are rich but not strong. The sole difference is that Germany and Japan are ruled by monarchs while France and America are republics. Our conclusion therefore is that no republic can be strong. . . . The best thing for us to do is to adopt part of the Prussian and part of the Japanese in our constitution-making. . . .

"The vital question of the day, setting aside all paper talk, is whether or not China has a suitable man to succeed President Yuan Shih-kai. . . . Confusion and disturbance will follow with great rapidity. Then foreign countries which have entertained wild ambitions, availing themselves of the distressful situation in China, will stir up ill-feelings among these parties and so increase the disturbances. When the proper time comes, various countries, unwilling to let a single country enjoy the privilege of controlling China, will resort to armed intervention. In consequence the eastern problem will end in a rupture of the international peace. Whether China will be turned at that time into a battleground for the Chinese people or for the foreign Powers I cannot tell you. It is too dreadful to think of the future which is enshrouded in a veil of mystery. However, I can tell you that the result of this awful turmoil will be either the slicing of China like a melon or the suppression of internal trouble with foreign assistance which will lead to dismemberment. As to the second result some explanation is necessary. After foreign countries have helped us to suppress internal disturbances, they will select a man of the type of Li Wang of Korea, who betrayed his country to Japan, and make him Emperor of China. Whether this man will be the deposed emperor or a member of the Imperial family or the leader of the rebel party, remains to be seen. In any event he will be a figurehead in whose hand will not be vested political, financial and military power, which will be controlled by foreigners. All the valuable mines, various kinds of industries and our abundant natural resources, will likewise be developed by others. China will thus disappear as a nation."(6)

Here in very glaring terms was shown the fear of attempting to work out a democracy in a world of supposedly militaristic nations. China was afraid to go on with the experiment. The only safety seemed to lie in a reversion to armed autocracy. The Asiatic world was not "safe for democracy," and China had no friend whom she could trust to make it safe for her to continue her attempts in that direction.

All these factors became clear later, but to observers living in China, the political situation in the fall of 1915 was full of mystery. Since the dissolution of Parliament the republic had been one in name rather than in fact; but the speed with which the monarchical movement gained headway surprised most onlookers. The sentiment among the middle and lower classes of the Yangtze Valley and the south seemed strongly against the monarchy and against Yuan Shih-kai for apparently supporting it. The writer talked with men of all classes--- ricksha-coolies, Confucian scholars, Buddhist priests, and returned students, and every one, after taking due precaution against being overheard, came out in support of the republic and denounced Yuan. Dr. Morrison, after a tour of inspection of the Yang-tse Valley, described the sentiment of the people as one of "solid resentment" against the whole movement. The feeling was even stronger in the south.

There were certain indications even then that Yuan Shih-kai was acquiescent in, if, indeed, not a supporter of, the monarchical movement. Persistent rumours came from close friends of his in the capital that he was influenced by his son to make the change for the latter's benefit as his successor. Only former officials and friends of the administration were allowed to vote in December. The editor of one of the Monarchist newspapers in Shanghai, which was blown up by the Republicans, stated outright amid the smoking ruins of his office that he had special permission from the Central Government for his propaganda. But the publication by the Republican Government in the following summer of over sixty secret communications of Yuan Shih-kai's Government preceding and during the election in the Fall brought out clearly the entire situation; the whole monarchical effort, in the words of Putnam Weale of Peking, was stamped as "a cool and singular plan to forge a national mandate which has few equals in history."

In publicly beginning its propaganda in August, following the publishing of the pamphlet by Yang Tu, the monarchical Movement very cleverly used a statement of Dr. Francis J. Goodnow, President of Johns Hopkins University, and political adviser to the Chinese Government. Dr. Goodnow's opinion was purely an academic one; he stated that a change from a republic to a monarchy could be successfully made under three conditions: first, that the peace of the country was not thereby imperiled; second, that the laws of succession should first be securely fixed; third, provision should be made for some form of constitutional government. Of course, the Monarchists, in quoting this opinion, entirely omitted these conditional clauses.

On Aug. 16 the Chou An Hui published its first manifesto referring to this statement. Yuan Shih-kai, in a speech before the State Council, said among other things: "I regard the proposed change as unsuitable to the circumstances of the country." But on Aug. 30 the first secret telegram was dispatched from Peking concerning the proposed change of government. It was a code telegram to the Military and Civil Governors of the provinces, to be deciphered personally by them with the Council of State code. After certain initial steps are mentioned in detail, the document reads:

"The plan suggested is for each province to send in a separate petition, the draft of which will be made in Peking and wired to the respective provinces in due course. . . . You will insert your own name as well as those of the gentry and merchants of the province who agree to the draft. These petitions are to be presented one by one to the Legislative Council as soon as it is convoked. At all events, the change in the form of the State will have to be effected under colour of carrying out the people's will."(7)

The Monarchical Society, realizing that matters had progressed sufficiently by this time for it to assert itself, on Sept. 27, under the leadership of Yang Tu and Sun Yu-chun, dispatched a code telegram to the Military and Civil Governors, asserting that all danger of a true expression of provincial wishes must be eradicated. The telegram offers suggestions regarding the government of the different districts and then concludes:

"In order to clothe the proceedings with an appearance of regularity, the representatives of the districts, though they are really appointed by the highest military and civil officials of the province, should still be nominally elected by the districts. As soon as the representatives of the districts have been appointed, their names should be communicated to the respective district magistrates, who are to be instructed to draw up the necessary documents in detail, and to cause a formal election to be held. Such documents should., however, be properly antedated."

On Sept. 29 Chu Chi-chun, Military Governor of Mukden, representing the Administrative Council, telegraphed as follows:

"While the plan of organization is determined by the Administrative Council, the carrying out of the ulterior object of such plan rests with the superintendents in chief of the election. They should, therefore, assume a controlling influence over the election proceedings and utilize them to the best advantage. The representatives of the citizens should be elected, one for each district wherever possible, from among the officials who are connected with the various Government organs in the provincial capital, so that there may be no misunderstanding as to the real object of voting."

This telegram indicated that the representative organ of the people was under the control of high officials and was "utilized" by them "to the best advantage," and that the representatives themselves were to be chosen from among those connected with the Government organizations in the various provincial capitals.

On October 11 the National Convention Bureau sent the following telegram:

"The future peace and safety of the nation depend upon the documents exchanged between the Government organs and Peking and those in the provinces. Should any of these come to the notice of the public, the blame for failure to keep official secrets will be laid upon us. Moreover, as these documents concern the very foundation of the State, they will, in case they become known, leave a dark spot on the political history of our country. Upon their secrecy depends our national honour and prestige in the eyes of both our own people and foreigners. . . . We hope you will appoint one of your confidential subordinates to be specially responsible for the safe custody of the secret documents."

Despite the increasing unrest among the people, a circular telegram was dispatched on Oct. 23, which apparently "drove the last nail into the coffin of the Chinese Republic." It was a nomination of Yuan Shih-kai, and read:

"The letters of nomination to be sent in after the form of state shall have been put to the vote, must contain the following words: 'We, the citizens' representatives, by virtue of the will of the citizens, do hereby respectfully nominate the present President Yuan Shih-kai as Emperor of the Chinese Empire, and invest him to the fullest extent with all the supreme sovereign rights of the State. He is appointed by Heaven to ascend the Throne and to transmit it to his heirs for ten thousand generations.' These characters, forty-five in all, must not be altered on any account.

"Before the form of the State has been settled, the letters of nomination must not be made public. A reply is requested."

Fig. 3. Yuan Shih-kui. First President of the Chinese Republic.

A few days later ---Oct. 28---the attention of the Central Government was drawn by Japan, England, and Russia (later supported by France and Italy as allies) toward the inadvisability of taking steps that would threaten the peace of China; but Lu. Cheng-hsiang, Minister of Foreign Affairs, replied that it was too late to retract, as the matter had already been decided. When their surprise over this unexpected reply had subsided, those in charge of the plot sent the following state telegram to the provinces:

"A certain foreign power, under the pretext that the Chinese people are not of one mind and that troubles are to be apprehended, has lately forced England and Russia to take part in tendering advice to China. In truth, all foreign nations know perfectly well that there will be no trouble, and they are obliged to follow the example of that power. If we accept the advice of other powers concerning our domestic affairs and postpone the enthronement, we should be recognizing their right to interfere. Hence, action should under no circumstances. be deferred. When all the votes of the provinces unanimously recommending the enthronement shall have reached Peking, the Government will, of course, ostensibly assume a wavering and compromising attitude, so as to give due regard to international relations. The people, on the other hand, should show their firm determination to proceed with the matter at all costs, so as to let the foreign powers know that our people are of one mind. If we can only make them believe that the change of the republic into a monarchy will not in the least give rise to trouble of any kind, the effects of the. advice tendered by Japan will ipso facto come to naught."(8)

On Dec. 21 was played the last act in the drama. Forty-eight hours before General Tsai Ao threw down the gauntlet in Yunnan, because of the strange quiet that pervaded the country the Monarchists boldly determined to pay no further heed to any suggestion that they withdraw from their purpose, even though force be threatened. For it had been discovered, after the ballot boxes were opened on Dec. 11 that every voter had cast his ballot for Yuan Shih-kai to be Emperor! And he, isolated in his palace from the populace and deceived by his followers, had accepted the nomination.

All that remained now was to blot out every trace of the conspiracy, that the deceit "should not stain the opening pages of the history of the new dynasty," as a later telegram read, which is in part quoted below:

"No matter how carefully their secrets may have been guarded (it asserts), still they remain as permanent records which might compromise us; and in the event of their becoming known to foreigners we shall not escape severe criticism and bitter attacks, and, what is worse, should they be handed down as part of the national records, they will stain the opening pages of the history of the new dynasty. The Central Government, after carefully considering the matter, has concluded that it would be better to sort out and burn the documents so as to remove all unnecessary records and prevent regrettable consequences. For these reasons you are hereby requested to sift out all telegrams, letters, and dispatches concerning the changes in the form of the State, whether official or private, whether received from Peking or the provinces (excepting those required by law to be filed on record), and cause the same to be burned in your presence."

Such intrigues were certain to bear fruit, and on Dec. 23, Tsai Ao and Tang Chi-yao, Governors of Yunnan, revolted, and blazed the way for the rebellion which ultimately should oust Yuan from power. They declared that Yuan had been guilty of "deliberately misrepresenting the people's will by inducements and threats," and took their stand once more for the republic. Yunnan was followed by Kweichow.

Despite this protest, the beginning of the new dynasty(9) was set for January 1, 1916, and the Government buildings in the larger cities were decorated with the national flag in honour of the event. Memorials praying for an early ascension of the throne were sent to Peking by various Monarchists. But on January 26, Yuan Shih-kai, dubbed the "Ta Huang Ti" ("Great Emperor") by the Peking Gazette, a Republican sympathizer, announced that the enthronement would be postponed: "The Province of Yunnan is opposing the Central Government and under some pretext a rebellion has been raised in these regions. . . . We are profoundly grieved to confess that a portion of the people are dissatisfied with us. . . . To perform the ceremony of enthronement at this juncture would, therefore, set our heart on thorns. The enthronement will have to be postponed to a date when the affairs in Yunnan are again under control."

The month of February was one of speculation and of discouragement on the part of the Republicans. The control of the military forces of the north was tightened in all suspected centres; Nanking, which had been the hotbed of revolution for the last four years, was practically under martial law; soldiers with fixed bayonets patrolled the streets; signs were put up in the tea houses and Government schools forbidding any discussion of political affairs; infractions of this rule were severely punished. But the unrest continued, a statement of one of the scholars in Nanking being indicative of public sentiment in general. On being asked by the author what he thought of the new flag which the Monarchists proposed for the nation, he said he thought the best design would be a white flag with a great black spot in the centre (for Yuan Shih-kai).

This dissatisfaction found active expression in the revolt on March 17 of Kuangsi, which made, among others, the following demands upon the Central Government: The cancellation of the empire and reinstitution of the republican form of government; the abdication of Yuan Shih-kai; and the convocation of a legislative body which should represent and be capable of expressing the authentic "will of the people."

On March 22 this was answered by a mandate from Yuan cancelling the whole monarchical movement. In it he said: "I am still of the opinion that the designation petitions submitted are unsuited to the demands of the time, and the official acceptance of the imperial throne is hereby cancelled. . . . I now confess that the faults of the country are the result of my own faults." Although Yuan had relinquished his ambition for the throne, he was not willing to abdicate entirely, and nothing short of this would satisfy the Southerners. Chekiang Province revolted and its Governor fled; Kwangtung followed. The press was full of fiery articles calling for Yuan's retirement. On April 27 General Tsai Ao, the great military leader of the Republicans, sent a long telegram to Peking urging Yuan to retire, and concluding with a threat: "If, however, you should continue to linger and delay to make a prompt decision in the sense of retirement and compel the people to elaborate their demands in plainer language, your retirement will be compulsory instead of voluntary, and your high virtue will be lowered." This was followed by a similar appeal by Dr. Wu Ting-fang.

Yuan remaining obdurate, on May 10 the southern provinces elected Li Yuan-hung as President. On May 17 Liang Chi-chao, the Republican leader, who had the highest reputation among the scholars of China, telegraphed Peking: "Since Hsaing-Cheng (Yuan Shih-kai) has been morally defeated in the eyes of Chinese as well as foreigners, the iron verdict has been passed on him demanding his retirement." This was backed on May 18, the following day, by a statement of 300 members of the former National Assembly, which Yuan had dissolved in 1913

Through all this discussion Nanking had remained neutral. On May 15 General Feng Kuo-chang held a conference of the representatives of the ten provinces which were still loyal. The conference accomplished little except to emphasize the growing demand for Yuan's retirement. On May 24 Szechuan revolted, and two days later Yuan first publicly announced his intention to retire, saying: "My wish to retire is my own and originated with myself. I have not the slightest idea of lingering with a longing heart at my post." On May 29 Yuan issued a long statement in which he reviewed in detail his action in connection with the attempted change of Government. Two sentences are rather interesting in the light of the present knowledge of the entire situation:

"I, the great President, have done everything I could to ascertain the real will of the people by taking measures to prevent every possible corruption, the same being in pursuance of my wish to respect the will of the people. . . . In dealing with others I, the great President, have always been guided by the principle of sincerity."

The comment upon this mandate by the editor of the Peking Gazette , himself a Chinese, is indicative of the sentiment of the country at that time:

"If there were not a growing danger with every day that the Chief Executive tarried in office, moderate Chinese might be inclined to read with some patience and in a sense of sympathy the mandate issued on Monday night, which we translate in full today. It is obviously the attempt of Yuan Shih-kai to set himself right with posterity and to state for the future historian his own version of a transaction that has made him weaker than the child-ruler who preceded him. There is no time to reread what has already been asseverated time and again to a skeptical world. There is no time to shed a tear for a fall from greatness that is without parallel in history. The nation's perils thicken and the voice of the people clamours for the retirement that is to bring surcease of their harassment. Again we bid him be wise and leave the work that must be done by other hands under surer knowledge of the great new forces in our midst."

During the following week Yuan Shih-kai became seriously ill, and on June 6 he died, the cause of his death being urinaemia. A few hours before his death he issued his last mandate, in which he handed over the Government to the Vice-President. His closing words were not without pathos: "Owing to my lack of virtue and ability, I have not been able fully to transform into deed what I have desired to accomplish; and I blush to say I have not realized one-ten-thousandth part of my original intention to save the country and the people. . . I was just thinking how I could retire into private life when illness has suddenly overtaken me. . . . The ancients once said, 'It is only when the living do try to become strong that the dead are not dead.' This is also the wish of me, the great President."

President Li Yuan-hung at once entered upon his office, beginning on June 7, according to the Peking Gazette, "the work that ought to have been begun four years ago." His first mandate was as follows:

I

"Yuan-hung has assumed the office of President on this the 7th day of the sixth month. Realizing his lack of virtue, he is extremely solicitous lest something may miscarry. His single aim will be to adhere strictly to law for the consolidation of the republic and the moulding of the country into a really constitutionally administered country. May all officials and people act in sympathy with this idea and with united soul and energy fulfil the part that is lacking in him. This is his great hope."

The issuing of the mandate was followed by telegrams from most of the provinces, stating their loyalty to the new President and to the Republican Government. A few days later Liang Shih-yi, the chief counsellor and adviser of Yuan Shih-kai among the Monarchists, resigned from his position in the Government; thus the chief obstacle to harmony was removed. The efforts of the new Republican Government were then directed toward the establishment of a Parliament, according to the Provisional Constitution adopted at Nanking in 1912. The Constitutional Compact adopted in May, 1914, was discarded. Parliament was reconvened on August 1, and the following month a Cabinet was formed with Tuan Chi-jui as Premier. Feng Kwo-chang was elected Vice-President. Thus the Republic of China again took up its course as a national entity.

The first year of the war had brought grave dangers to the Chinese Republic from without. In the second year it encountered equally grave dangers from within. The overthrow of militarism, for a time at least, within its own borders, prepared the way for a more sympathetic understanding of the great world situation in which a similar principle was at stake. In its best ideals and traditions China had always been an opponent of military power unfettered by the will of the people. The right of rebellion against tyrants had brought to a close many of its ancient dynasties. The scholar had stood the highest in the social scale: the soldier the lowest. The Confucian Classics, which have had a greater influence than any other writing in moulding the mind of the people, contain many passages emphasizing the importance of the government being founded on the popular will, and designating the ruler as a servant of the people. "In a state, the people are most important: the ruler is of least importance." "Heaven (or God) sees as my people see: Heaven (or God) hears as my people hear." "The commander of the forces of a large state may be carried off, but the will of even the humblest of its subjects cannot be taken from him." In the Analects, the essentials of government had been named: imperfect as was the comprehension of the average Chinese in 1915-1916 of all that democracy and popular government meant, there seemed to have been some glimmering understanding concerning the principles at stake: principles which were named by the Great Sage of China over twenty-four hundred years ago.

Tsze-kung asked about Government. The Master (Confucius) said, "The essentials of Government are that there be sufficient food, sufficient military equipment, and the confidence of the people in their rulers." Tsze-kung said: "If it cannot be helped, and one of these must be dispensed with, which of the three should be foregone first?"

"The military equipment," said the Master.

Tsze-kung again asked: "If it cannot be helped, and one of the remaining two must be dispensed with, which of them should be foregone ?

The Master answered: "Part with the food. For, from of old, death has been the lot of all men; but if the people have no faith in their rulers, the State cannot stand."(10)

CHAPTER III

THE PROGRESS OF CHINESE REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT LEADING TO A NEW FOREIGN POLICY

On the third anniversary of the outbreak of the Great War, Parliament was reconvened in China, and a new start was made upon Republican paths. Following the death of Yuan Shih-kai in June, Li Yuan-hung had been made President; Feng Kwo-chang, Governor of Kiangsu Province, and recognized leader of the Yangtze Valley region, had been elected Vice-President; and General Tuan Chi-jui, appointed Premier of the Cabinet, which was organized in September. On Sept. 15th, Parliament set to work on the drafting of the permanent constitution. The Chinese ship of state seemed to be sailing on comparatively smooth waters. This calm was not broken until the bursting of the storm over the declaration of war with Germany and Austria eight months later.

The general satisfaction over the progress in constitutional government is shown by a description of state affairs sent to America by the writer on Feb. 11, 1917

"Hangchow, China.

"The prophecy made in verse by Rudyard Kipling concerning the fate of the man who should try to 'hustle the East' is fast becoming an anachronism. It is especially inapplicable to the evolution of the government of China. A year ago the infant republic apparently had been strangled and a monarchy reared in its stead; January 1, 1916, was set as the beginning of the new dynasty with Yuan Shih-kai at its head; and preparations were being made for the enthronement; no discussion of political affairs was allowed, signs forbidding it being put up in all public places. A protest against the monarchy by Liang Chi-chao, one of the chief Republican leaders, involved him, as he himself admitted, 'in serious difficulties, exposing his life to grave dangers.' Now, however, all this is changed. The republic has been re-established, Parliament having been in session over seven months; Yuan Shih-kai is dead, and President Li Yuan-hung is at the head of the Government; the draft constitution for the republic has passed the first reading, with its articles guaranteeing freedom of speech and freedom of worship; Liang Chi-chao himself has visited Peking where he was honoured as few Chinese have been honoured by their countrymen. A concrete illustration of the comparative strength of Yuan Shih-kai's government and the present one is afforded by the situation in this city of Hangchow, the capital of Chekang Province. Ten months ago following the lead of Yunnan, Kweichow, and Kuangsi, Chekiang revolted against Yuan Shih-kai, and declared itself in favour of a real republic. The Governor, who was a friend of Yuan, was forced to flee; and all connection with Peking was severed. Today as a result of a minor quarrel among the Hangchow officials, the central Government has sent down its own appointee, Yang Shan-teh, as Governor, and he has been accepted by the people without disturbance. This is the first time that an outside representative of the central Government has been Governor of Chekiang, and in the judgment of experienced foreigners, his acceptance by the people is a valuable indication of the strength of the present government. In the words of Putnam Weale, of Peking, 'President Li Yuan-hung's seven months' quiet tenure of office has indeed brought the prospects of ultimate success much nearer than it was at any time under Yuan Shih-kai's so-called iron rule, proving conclusively that in civilized communities, reason has many times the value of that disruptive and criminal agency, force.'

"The whole political situation, marking the emergence of China from the realm of mediaeval, autocratic government into that of modern, representative government, is a drama of intense interest. The Chinese are passing through the same stages in political philosophy that America and France and other democratic nations have traversed. They are settling now their "Magna Charta" and their "Bill of Rights." The discussion of the constitution was begun on September 15, with C. T. Wang, whom I knew at Yale, now the Vice President of the Senate, as Chairman of the Preliminary Examination meetings. The first reading was finished and a report made on January 19th. The eleven original chapters and several additional ones were discussed. The chapters concerning the "form of State," that of a republic; the rights of citizens, including freedom of speech, and freedom of worship; the two-house system of parliament; the appointment of a Premier and Cabinet; the organization of law courts; were all passed by the necessary three-quarter vote of the quorum made up of two-thirds membership of the two houses."

There were three subjects which aroused special discussion at the Capital. They were the budget, local self-government and State religion. The matter of finance was always a trying one, as China had to rely largely on foreign loans. The money advanced by America was generally welcomed, and the announcement that America intended to encourage investment in China was greeted with satisfaction.

The provincial self-government bill was passed in the first reading January 10th after much discussion, and the President issued a mandate supporting it. He said in part:

"In the olden days the district and prefect system formed the beginning of an excellent system of government, and the services of the village elders and district councillors were reported as valuable aids to good administration. The spirit of self-government had therefore already been developed in ancient times. . . . In the Tsing Dynasty a beginning was made in self-government, and a system far from complete and satisfactory was set up. When the republic was formed the work was continued . . . and at this time of general reform, when it is necessary to build up a strong foundation of democratic administration, we should draw up a suitable system, and enforce the same within a definite time limit. . . . By such a system we may reach the stage of universal peace. This is my ambitious hope."

The question of a state religion was brought up in connection with Chapter Three of the Constitution, guaranteeing religious liberty for all. An article of that chapter stated that the Confucian ethics should be used as a basis in primary education. A movement was started among the older, conservative members of Parliament to have Confucianism as a state religion, but of the twenty "parties" or groups in Parliament, a canvass revealed that only four supported this measure, although most of them favoured an emphasis upon Confucian ethics in the school system.

Fig. 4. Lin Yuan-hung. Second President of the Chinese Republic.

During the first week of February the discussion was most lively while this article was undergoing a second reading. Various arguments were advanced on either side, several of them sounding rather strange in the ears of foreigners. Some of the points in favour of Confucianism were: (1) The great influence of Confucius in China in the past and present; (2) the foreign mission schools teach the "Four Books" of Confucius (3) most of the Western Nations have discarded Christianity; and China should not seek to pick it up.

Against the measure: (1) Confucius was a teacher of ethics, not religion; (2) his teaching has more to do with the sovereign than the people, and is not fitting for a republic; (3) a state religion was not republican; (4) such a measure would conflict with the chapter on religious freedom. Finally, on February 9th it was voted to cease discussion, and five different amendments advocating a state religion were defeated. The Peking Gazette, edited by a young progressive Chinese, commented thus upon the meeting:

"Yesterday's meeting of the Conference on Constitution was historic for the reason that the question whether the Republic of China shall create a precedent, in the history of Republicanism by making one of the many religions, if Confucianism can be called a religion, the State religion of the country, was settled after a long and serious struggle. The Confucianists resorted to every possible means to win but the odds against them were too strong. The question of freedom of religious belief is by no means settled but the attempt to give the Republic a State religion has been definitely defeated."

A few quotations from the native press of the country will reveal the spirit of the people at that time. It should be remembered that a year before practically no expression of public opinion was allowed.

On January 12th the Min-Kwo-hsin-pao spoke as follows:

"Coming as we do in sight of the sacred instrument of Government which is to protect us from tyranny and misrule and assure to us the blessings of liberty and democracy, it is fitting that we recall the bloodshed and tribulations, through which we have triumphed over monarchy and autocracy. . . . The mere possession of a Constitution is one thing, and its enjoyment is another. We care for no hollow Constitution, but we are willing to die for a Constitution that is a reality. We know the spirit of our people, so 'Ten Thousand Years' to our Constitution."

On January 17th the Kung-min-pao expressed itself thus:

"We have a Republic but not a democracy. The Republic was established by the revolution of 1911. But Democracy is still in the making. By wresting from the Monarchy our form of government, half of the battle was won; and now we have to bend our energy to training our people in democracy."

On January 27th the Peking Jih-pao emphasized the need of moral strength back of all political changes --- its message was a thoughtful and valuable one at, that time:

"Signs of progress in the country are not lacking. Intellectually the people have taken a leap forward. The idea of democracy and general knowledge of modern learning are gradually being spread among the people. This is a hopeful sign. But knowledge without moral backbone is worse than ignorance. The morality of our people, we are sorry to say, has not kept pace with their advance in knowledge. We are in the same predicament as France was immediately after her great revolution. The people have cut adrift from old traditions, but have not assimilated new ideas and principles rapidly enough to supply the resulting moral vacuum. We can say without fearing challenge that the morality of the people is everything in the life of a nation. While we may be busy instituting reforms and improving the minds of the people, we must not for a minute lose sight of this signal fact---the soul of the nation."

In conclusion, the opinions of two foreigners, one an Englishman, the other an American, concerning the situation as it then appeared, are worthy of quotation. The first is Mr. Putnam Weale, for many years a correspondent in Peking, and author of several standard books on the Far East. On January 16th, he wrote in the Peking Gazette as follows:

"The conviction which the writer has consistently cherished, that the situation in this country is as good as could possibly be expected --- and gives reasonable promise of peaceful development in the future --- seems based on sound premises. . . . The Chinese as a people are temperamentally suited to representative government; they are reasonable, tactful, conciliatory and humorous; four saving graces which will carry them very far along the road to political success. Like a solid piece of iron which binds the nation together is its immense, majestic, abiding common-sense."

At a recent dinner in Shanghai given by the American Consul General, which was attended by prominent Chinese and Americans, the Honourable Victor Murdoch spoke as follows:

"The Republic is here to stay in China; the same brand of democracy which has built up the United States can build up China. . . . I have observed a great deal of this spirit while I have been here in China. . . . Here is a wonderful people, industrious beyond any other people, sober beyond others, good-humoured, and law-abiding. . . . No one can reach the limits of China. China is the place of the future. I have been impressed by everything I have seen in this country, with its promise of future development, but one thought that lingers longest in my mind is this: China's future development and prosperity lie in her form of government. It must be a republic to obtain results. What the old flag has done for America, the Chinese flag can do for the Chinese people. It is a banner of no dynasty but a people's flag, and people who are industrious and sober and self-governing, can endure for ever---and so can the United States and China."

This was the situation in China when the announcement of Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare was made to the World. That policy irrevocably changed the course of the Nations, and brought the American Republic to the brink of war; the great Republic in the Orient was not to escape similar effects.

CHAPTER IV

CHINA'S SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE CENTRAL POWERS

At the outbreak of the World War, as has been related, China declared its neutrality, and bent all its energies to the building up of its newly-founded republic. But before the middle of the third year of the war had passed, it became apparent that the Republic must take some stand in relation to the issues of the great struggle. Four conditions influenced it in this regard. The Republic seemed at last to be making headway toward stability and permanence, and with the new national consciousness came a clearer realization of the principles at stake in the war. Secondly, China desired a place at the Peace Conference which would settle the question of the disposal of Kiaochow and the German interests in Shantung and, as she hoped, would review the Twenty-one Demands. In 1905 in the Portsmouth Treaty, Japan had negotiated directly with Russia concerning Manchuria, although it was a province of China, and China was not admitted until the final decisions were reached. This was a precedent which China could not afford to see repeated in Shantung, if she were to continue as a sovereign state; and so she was ready to make any effort to gain a voice in the eventual international conference. In the third place, America seemed to be more and more turning toward some sort of active participation in the conflict, and China desired to keep its foreign policy close in accord with that of the nation which it regarded as its best friend. Finally, two incidents in its foreign relations in the latter part of 1917 had aroused China afresh to a consciousness of its weakness and its lack of international standing. These two events were the Chengchiatun dispute with Japan in Manchuria, and the Lao-hsi-kai incident in Tientsin with the French Government.

Chengchiatun was a Manchurian market-town situated near the Mongolian border. It was of some importance as a trade centre and had been menaced by one of the Mongol brigands at the time of the Manchu restoration. The Twenty-eighth Division of the Chinese army had been stationed there to protect the town and preserve order. In August a detachment of Japanese troops was sent there to carry out manoeuvres. Their presence in that portion of Manchuria could be justified only by a most liberal interpretation of Japanese treaty-rights. On August 13, a dispute arose between a Japanese merchant named Yoshimoto and a Chinese fish-pedlar; the Japanese attempted to punish the pedlar; a Chinese soldier interfered; other soldiers of both nationalities came up; and a mÍlÈe resulted, in which several Japanese and Chinese were wounded and killed. Exaggerated reports were published in the Japanese press and its Government at once took up the matter and demanded a series of privileges and concessions in that region and the neighbouring territory. The first demands were:

1. Punishment of the General commanding the Twenty-eighth Division.

2. The dismissal of officers at Chengchiatun responsible for the occurrence as well as the severe punishment of those who took direct part in the fracas.

3. Proclamations to be posted ordering all Chinese soldiers and civilians in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to refrain from any act calculated to provoke a breach of the peace with Japanese soldiers or civilians.

4. China to agree to the stationing of Japanese police officers in places in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia where their presence was considered necessary for the protection of Japanese subjects. China also to agree to the engagement by the officials of South Manchuria of Japanese police advisers.

And in addition:

1. Chinese troops stationed in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to employ a certain number of Japanese military officers as advisers.

2. Chinese military cadet schools to employ a certain number of Japanese military officers as instructors.

3. The Military Governor of Mukden to proceed personally to Port Arthur to the Japanese Military Governor of Kwantung to apologize for the occurrence and to tender similar personal apologies to the Japanese Consul General in Mukden.

4. Adequate compensation to be paid by China to the Japanese sufferers and to the families of those killed.

These privileges if granted would have paved the way for a Japanese Protectorate over Southern Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia. Negotiations continued during the fall and final agreement was reached on the five following terms:

1. The General commanding the Twenty-eighth Division to be reprimanded.

2. Officers responsible to be punished according to law. If the law provides for severe punishment, such punishment will be inflicted.

3. Proclamations to be issued enjoining Chinese soldiers and civilians in the districts where there is mixed residence to accord considerate treatment to Japanese soldiers and civilians.

4. The Military Governor of Mukden to send a representative to Port Arthur to convey his regret when the Military Governor of Kwantung and Japanese Consul General at Mukden are there together.

5. A solatium of $500 (Five Hundred Dollars) to be given to the Japanese merchant Yoshimoto.

This settlement was generally satisfactory to the Chinese; but the original demands had caused them much anxiety, and impressed upon them the necessity of securing a better understanding of their rights as a sovereign power.

The Lao-hsi-kai incident with France was of less importance. The French Consular authorities of Tientsin desired to have their concession extended and had been negotiating with the Chinese Government for additional space. The negotiations had dragged on for some years and a final agreement had been practically reached concerning this additional grant of land which was to be put under the jurisdiction of a joint Franco-Chinese Administration. Some additional opposition was raised by the Chinese, and finally the French Consul-General sent an ultimatum demanding that the Chinese police be removed and the additional territory be placed under French supervision and control. The time-limit of the ultimatum having expired, a French detachment of soldiers took possession of the property; the Chinese policemen were removed and imprisoned; and French sentries were stationed along the boundary. Protests arose from the Chinese of the city and of North China; the native servants and employÈs of the French Concession left in a body. The arrested Chinese police were ultimately released but no immediate settlement was reached concerning the matter in question. The incident could easily have been averted and was not of great importance, except as it was used by German propagandists, but it served to increase China's desire to be treated as an equal by the European Powers.

For the reasons cited, the country was ready in the fall of 1916 to step out into a more active participation in the world's events, and when President Wilson sent out his peace inquiry of December 19, 1916, China answered at once, expressing its willingness to join in the international effort to eradicate wars of aggression; "to assure the respect of the principle of the equality of nations, whatever their power may be, and to relieve them of the peril of wrong and violence." The note of the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the American Minister at Peking was as follows:

"I have examined with the care which the gravity of the question demands the note concerning peace which President Wilson has addressed to the Governments of the Allies and the Central Powers now at war and the text of which Your Excellency has been good enough to transmit to me under instructions of your Government.

"China, a nation traditionally pacific, has recently again manifested her sentiments in concluding treaties concerning the pacific settlement of international disputes, responding thus to the voeux of the Peace Conference held at The Hague.

"On the other hand, the present war, by its prolongation, has seriously affected the interests of China, more so perhaps than those of other Powers which have remained neutral. She is at present at a time of reorganization which demands economically and industrially the co-operation of foreign countries, a co-operation which a large number of them are unable to accord on account of the war in which they are engaged.

"In manifesting her sympathy for the spirit of the President's Note, having in view the ending as soon as possible of the hostilities, China is but acting in conformity not only with her interests but also with her profound sentiments.

"On account of the extent which modern wars are apt to assume and the repercussions which they bring about, their effects are no longer limited to belligerent States. All countries are interested in seeing wars becoming as rare as possible. Consequently China cannot but show satisfaction with the views of the Government and people of the United States of America who declare themselves ready, and even eager, to co-operate when the war is over, by all proper means to assure the respect of the principle of the equality of nations, whatever their power may be, and to relieve them of the peril of wrong and violence. China is ready to join her efforts with. theirs for the attainment of such results which can only be obtained through the help of all."

Thus China was ready to act, when the German Government threw down the challenge to the civilized world by its declaration of unlimited submarine warfare. America severed diplomatic relations, and on February 4th sent a note to China, as to all neutrals, suggesting that they follow its example. In less than a week the Chinese Republic actually took this step. Writing from China on February 16th, the author described the decision as follows:

Hangchow, China, February 16.

"The severance of diplomatic relations between America and Germany has had far-reaching effects in China. I was in Shanghai when the news came and the city, in which there are over 20,000 foreigners, including 1000 Germans, was greatly stirred. Crowds gathered around the bulletin boards, just as they did in Europe during the first days of August, 1914. The English and French were openly elated; the Germans were correspondingly depressed; and the Chinese appeared in doubt as to their action in this crisis. The American gunboats and cruisers in the harbour were loading supplies and coaling, in preparation for departure in case a declaration of war necessitated such action.

"The indecision which at first marked the action of the Chinese and their government, has been cast aside by the decision of the government on February 9, when it boldly followed the course of America by sending a similar declaration to Germany. This action has been greeted on all sides as a sign of the virility of the present republican government, and the first step in modern participation in world affairs.

"After America severed relations with Germany there was serious discussion at Peking of China's future action. The younger element in the government were eager to follow America's example; the older, more conservative leaders counselled caution and a maintenance of neutrality. The most experienced statesmen, including Liang Chi-chao, who is so largely responsible for the present Republican government, were summoned to the capitol for conference. Finally, after an all-day meeting on February 9, decisive action was agreed upon, and notes were sent to Germany and to America. The note to Germany follows:

"'A telegraphic communication has been received from the Chinese minister at Berlin transmitting a note from the German government dated February 1, 1917, which makes known that the measures of blockade newly adopted by the government of Germany will, from that day, endanger neutral merchant vessels navigating in certain prescribed zones.

"'The new measures of submarine warfare inaugurated by Germany, imperiling the lives and property of Chinese citizens to even a greater extent than the measures previously taken which have already cost so many human lives to China, constitute a violation of the principles of public international law at present in force; the tolerance of their application would have as a result the introduction into international law of arbitrary principles incompatible with even legitimate commercial intercourse between neutral states and belligerent powers.

"'The Chinese government, therefore, protests energetically to the imperial German government against measures proclaimed on February 1, and sincerely hopes that with a view to respecting the rights of neutral states and to maintaining the friendly relations between these two countries, the said measures will not be carried out.

"'In case contrary to its expectations its protest be ineffectual the government of the Chinese republic will be constrained to its profound regret, to sever diplomatic relations at present existing between the two countries. It is unnecessary to add that the attitude of the Chinese government has been dictated purely by the desire to further the cause of the world's peace and by the maintenance of the sanctity of international law.'

"On the same day China, through its Foreign Minister, sent the following note to the American Minister in Peking for transmission to the United States Government:

"'I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's note of the 4th of February, 1917, informing me that the government of the United States of America, in view of the adoption by the German government of its new policy of submarine warfare on February 1st, has decided to take certain action which it judges necessary as regards Germany.

"'The Chinese government, like the President of the United States of America, is reluctant to believe that the German government will actually carry into execution those measures which imperil the lives and property of citizens of neutral states and jeopardize the commerce, even legitimate, between neutrals as well as between neutrals and belligerents and which tend, if allowed to be enforced without opposition, to introduce a new principle into public international law.

"'The Chinese government also proposes to take such action in the future as will be deemed necessary for the maintenance of the principles of international law.'

"The China Press, an American newspaper of Shanghai, comments thus upon this action:

"'The note of warning to Germany marks a bold and heroic departure from historic precedent for China. It shows that things are moving in the republic, and moving rapidly, and we believe that it will be fully justified by events.'

"In commenting on the action, the Peking Gazette, a native paper, says that 'The decision arrived at is in every sense a victory of the younger intellectual forces over the older mandarinate, whose traditions of laissez faire and spineless diplomacy have hitherto cost China so much.'

"These sentiments are re-echoed in various other native papers that decry 'Prussian militarism'--and advise China's following America's action. The reasons underlying the decision are expressed fairly well by the Kun Yuan Pao in an editorial which appeared under the headline 'Now or Never,' the day before the government acted:

"'This is the time for action. We must range ourselves on the side of justice, of humanity and of international law. We must also win a place for ourselves, friends, in the council of nations by prompt and decisive action. Now, Germany's submarine policy and the United States' resolute stand against lawlessness and wholesale atrocity have given us the opportunity.

"'Germany's submarine policy is a challenge to the world. America has accepted the challenge. Shall we do otherwise? If we have a particle of respect for ourselves, the way pointed out by the United States is the road to honour and self-respect.

"'Then, is it not altogether unprofitable to join the allies if we consider the question only from a national point of view? In the present state of the world, it is impossible for any nation to stand alone. We must have allies, if not so sanctified in treaties, yet in a mutual bond of sympathy. This is the best opportunity for us to win friends among the powers. Possibly we will have only a little say in the peace conference, but since we have been willing to help Great Britain, France, Russia and the United States, our appeal will not be unheeded when we should be in difficulties. Although we have been observing the strictest neutrality in the war, there are many questions at the peace conference which will touch us vitally. There is, for instance, the question of Tsingtao to settle, and the Japanese actions in Manchuria and in connection with the Twenty-one demands will have to be brought up in review. Cultivate friendship when our friends are in need, and not when they are above wants. Now or never must we show the world that this is a nation which is not always on the sick list, but living, pulsating and with a fighting spirit.'"

After the sending of the Chinese note to Germany nothing was heard from that quarter for several weeks. Then came the torpedoing of the French ship, Atlas, on which were over five hundred Chinese labourers. The Cabinet was in favour of breaking off relations, and on March 10th the question was sent to Parliament for decision. The Lower House upheld the Cabinet decision and the next day the Senate did the same.

The long-awaited German answer arrived on the day the Lower House voted. In part it was as follows:

"The Imperial German Government expresses its great surprise at the action threatened by the Government of the Republic of China in its note of protest. Many other countries have also protested, but China, which has been in friendly relations with Germany, is the only State which has added a threat to its protest.

. . . "Germany's enemies were the first to declare a blockade on Germany and the same is being persistently carried out. It is therefore difficult for Germany to cancel her blockade policy. The Imperial Government is nevertheless willing to comply with the wishes of the Government of the Republic of China by opening negotiations to arrive at a plan for the protection of Chinese life and property, with the view that the end may be achieved and thereby the utmost regard be given to the shipping rights of China. The reason which has prompted the Imperial Government to adopt this conciliatory policy is the knowledge that, once diplomatic relations are severed with Germany, China will not only lose a truly good friend but will also be entangled in unthinkable difficulties."

This note arrived too late to have any effect on Parliament, which upheld the decision of the Cabinet as indicated.

The mildness of Germany's note of March 10th was rather a surprise to the inhabitants of China, who remembered the seizure of Tsingtao in 1898, and other actions in Shantung as the result of the murder of two German missionaries; and the ruthlessness of the German troops at the time of the Boxer uprising. A leading Chinese lawyer commented on the change of attitude, his remarks being an indication of the new position won by China in world-politics:

"The troops under Count Waldersee, leaving Germany for the relief of Peking, were instructed by the War Lord to grant no quarter to the Chinese; on the other hand, the latter were to be so disciplined that they would never dare look a German in the face again..(11) The whirligig of time brings in its own revenge, and today, after the lapse of scarcely seventeen years, we hear the Vossische Zeitung commenting on the diplomatic rupture between China and Germany, lamenting that even so weak a State as the Far Eastern Republic dares look defiantly at the German nation!"

On March 14th the German and Austrian Ministers and their staffs were handed their passports and the German and Austrian interests were turned over to the Dutch Legation. Thus did China take its first step toward participation in the cause of the Allies.

CHAPTER V

CHINA'S DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY AND AUSTRIA

On March 14, 1917, China severed diplomatic relations with Germany; exactly five months later, on August 14th, she declared war. The strain of reaching this final decision shook the Republic to its foundations, temporarily causing a complete breakdown of the Central Government, and indirectly making possible the brief restoration of the Manchus which took place in July. But eventually the Chinese ship-of-state righted itself and emerged on the broad seas of world-relationships as a recognized member of the league of the Allies.

The breaking off of relations with Germany brought to light the state of discord which had existed for some time between the Premier, Tuan Chi-jui, and the President, Li Yuan-hung. The former was a military leader and had been trained in the Manchu type of government. The latter was a real republican in spirit and had insisted that every act of the State be carried out according to the existing Constitution. The Premier desired to break off relations without consulting Parliament; the President insisted on the latter step, and after Tuan had threatened to resign, and had actually left the capital for Tientsin, the President persuaded him to return and to present the question to Parliament. This was done with the result already indicated.

Having taken two steps, the next move was to declare war. Here, however, appeared many difficulties. It is hard for a foreigner to judge Chinese public opinion, but after a trip through the coast cities into the interior, the following arguments for and against the declaration seemed to the writer to be involved.(12)

The reasons in favour of the declaration seemed to be four in number. First, the intelligent Chinese sympathized deeply with the cause of the Allies, especially in their championing the rights of small or weak nations, with the protection of such countries from aggression and the assurance to them of the right to work out their own destinies unafraid. This formula seemed to fit the facts of China's relationships in the Orient. She was trying to build up a republic; she had made many costly mistakes; but ultimate success seemed possible if she could be protected from attack by predatory powers. The Allies promised such protection to all such weak nations, and China could not but be in sympathy with their aims.

Secondly, China desired a place in the Peace Conference which would be held at the close of the war. There were many questions affecting its own territory and rights which would come up then, and China desired a voice in their settlement. The German rights in Shantung which seemed likely to fall to Japan; the subject of the Twenty-one Demands; the future of the Boxer Indemnity; the principle of ex-territoriality and foreign control of some of China's sovereign rights; all these and many other matters might be reviewed at this future conference. China wished to be heard there, and the best hope of securing a place at the Council Table seemed to lie in joining the Allies.

China has always been influenced by the United States; she trusts American friendship; and is willing to follow its leadership. The United States is the only great nation which has never deprived China of any of its territorial possessions; by the return of the unused portion of the Boxer Indemnity, she had impressed China with the genuineness of her friendship; through the Chinese students who have gone to America, the best traditions of the Republic had been brought to China. The Chinese Republic was striving after American ideals of freedom and democracy, and in shaping its international policy it was ready to listen to America's voice. Moreover, the American Minister at Peking, Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, had a wide influence among Chinese officials.(13) Thus, when the United States severed relations with Germany, China at once followed suit; when America declared war in April, the Chinese leaders were ready to do the same, and were delayed only by the internal situation which at once arose.

In the fourth place, the joining of the Allies seemed to promise to the party in power which made this decision, considerable advantages in strength and prestige, and the Chinese politicians were not slow to grasp this fact.

An example of the reasoning of those in favour of a declaration of war was that of the scholar Liang Chi-chao, whose services to the Republic have already been mentioned.

"The peace of the Far East was broken by the occupation of Kiaochow by Germany. This event marked the first step of the German disregard for international law. In the interests of humanity and for the sake of what China has passed through, she should rise and punish such a country, that dared to disregard international law. Such a reason for war is certainly beyond criticism.

. . . "Some say that China should not declare war on Germany until we have come to a definite understanding with the Entente Allies respecting certain terms. This is indeed a wrong conception of things. We declare war because we want to fight for humanity, international law and against a national enemy. It is not because we are partial towards the Entente or against Germany or Austria. International relations are not commercial connexions. Why then should we talk about exchange of privileges and rights? As to the revision of customs tariff, it has been our aspiration for more than ten years and a foremost diplomatic question, for which we have been looking for a suitable opportunity to negotiate with the foreign Powers. It is our view that the opportunity has come because foreign Powers are now on very friendly terms with China. It is distinctly a separate thing from the declaration of war. Let no one try to confuse the two.

. . . "In conclusion I wish to say that whenever a policy is adopted we should carry out the complete scheme. If we should hesitate in the middle and become afraid to go ahead we will soon find ourselves in an embarrassing position. The Government and Parliament should therefore stir up courage and boldly make the decision and take the step."

Opposed to the four general reasons given for participation on the side of the Allies, there were five groups of arguments. The first was the difficulty China had in reconciling the professed aims of the Allies with its experienced relations with Japan. Rightly or wrongly, for the past twenty years, China had stood in mortal terror of its island neighbour. It had lost to it Formosa, Korea, portions of Manchuria and Mongolia, Tsingtao and the German holdings in Shantung, and had just recently gone through the humiliation of the Twenty-one Demands. The Allied program in Europe called for reparation and restitution for international injuries; China could not understand why this principle should not be accepted in Asia, especially as it applied to its relations with Japan. The existing Terauchi government professed to be friendly to China, but the Chinese felt that such a friendly attitude could not now be reciprocated, unless reparation were made for the acts of the past. Thus fear of Japan was an undoubted obstacle to China's believing in the Allied aims as applied to the Orient.

In the second place, the Chinese were still afraid of Germany's power and feared the eventual vengeance of its army if China should dare to declare war. German propaganda had skilfully magnified German successes and Allied losses, and in 1917 the average Chinese believed firmly that Germany would win the war. German officers had trained the Chinese army, as they had the Japanese troops, and they stood for military efficiency and power in the eyes of the Chinese.

Furthermore, Germany, despite its harsh treatment in the past, had energetically and cleverly conducted a campaign to win the favour of the Chinese, sending out consuls and diplomatic officials who were scholars in Chinese literature and philosophy with sufficient funds to entertain Chinese officials as they like to be entertained; on the other hand, the Allies had at various times, perhaps unconsciously, offended the Chinese. The opium trade,---carried on largely by citizens of the Allied countries in the foreign settlements,--- which followed the British "opium war" and the seizure of Hong-kong and other territory; the recent Lao-hsi-kai affair in Tientsin, where French officials attempted to appropriate property which the Chinese thought was theirs; the advice of the American adviser, Dr. Goodnow, to return to the Monarchy; the ineffectual enforcement of the Open Door; all these facts tended to produce a pessimism in the minds of the Chinese regarding idealistic words which seemed to be unbacked by deeds. This pessimism was shared by many of the younger foreign educated leaders in regard to the favourable outcome of the Conference at the close of the war; to many it seemed immaterial whether or not China should have a voice in the council.

In the fourth place, the younger progressive element of the republic feared the new power which would accrue to the more conservative party in control of the government at the time of the war-decision. They were afraid that the new power would be used as Yuan Shih-kai had used the financial support of the five Powers in 1913, to restrict and harm the more democratic tendencies of the Republic.

Other factors were a realization that their own military power was slight, and a fear of "losing face" by comparison with the Allies; the fear that food prices would increase; the devotion to peace, which is deep rooted in the nation; and finally the policy of "proud isolation," which until recent years had marked all China's relations with other nations. It was a long step for a people ruled for centuries by an alien dynasty to attempt republican self-government: it was an almost incredible act for China as a whole to grasp the existing world situation and to take its proper place in relation to it.

An illustration of this general opposition against the declaration of war was the statement of Kang Yu-wei, formerly a fellow-reformer of Liang Chichao. In it he said in part:

. . . "The breach between the United States and Germany is no concern of ours. But the Government suddenly severed diplomatic relations with Germany and is now contemplating entry into the war. This is to advance beyond the action of the United States which continues to observe neutrality. And if we analyse the public opinion of the country, we find that all peoples --- high and low, well-informed and ignorant---betray great alarm when informed of the rupture and the proposal to declare war on Germany, fearing that such development may cause grave peril to the country.

. . . "Which side will win the war? I shall not attempt to predict here. But it is undoubted that all the arms of Europe ---and, the industrial and financial strength of the United States and Japan --- have proved unavailing against Germany. On the other hand, France has lost her Northern provinces; and Belgium, Serbia and Rumania are blotted off the map. Should Germany be victorious, the whole of Europe --- not to speak of a weak country like China --- would be in great peril of extinction. Should she be defeated, Germany still can --- after the conclusion of peace --- send a fleet to war against us. And as the Powers will be afraid of a second world-war, who will come to our aid? Have we not seen the example of Korea? There is no such thing as an army of righteousness which will come to the assistance of weak nations. I cannot bear to think of hearing the angry voice of German guns along our coasts!"(14)

Such was the situation in general, following the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany. Public opinion seemed about evenly divided, but nevertheless it seemed fairly certain that the "third step" of the declaration of war against Germany would be taken in due time. Thus, on April 16, following the detention of the Chinese Minister at Berlin, the Peking Gazette, the most influential of the papers published by the Chinese, requested an early decision. But at this point the Premier thought fit to summon a council of Military Governors and their representatives to hasten the decision of the country, and the ultimate consequences were disastrous.

The conference met April 25. After much arguing and exhorting, the majority of the conference were won over to the view of the Premier. But signs of opposition on the part of the Parliament against the Premier and his supporters began to develop. There was also the feeling that the Premier had promised certain returns from the Allies, such as increase of the Chinese customs duties, and relief from the Boxer indemnity, but that on account of the opposition of Japan, and for other reasons, these returns could not be secured.

On May 1, however, the Cabinet passed the vote for war without asking conditions or returns, and on May 7 the President, through the Cabinet, sent a formal request to Parliament to approve of this declaration. Parliament delayed, and then, on May 10, an attempt was made to force it into a decision by a mob which gathered outside the National Assembly and threatened the members of both houses. There seems to be little doubt that some official of the Government had incited and promised protection to the mob, as it collected at 10 o'clock in the morning and was not dispersed until 11 at night, when the report was circulated that a Japanese journalist had been killed. The Peking Gazette openly accused the Premier of being behind the riot. Telegrams from all parts of the country poured in protesting against this attempted coercing of Parliament; all the Ministers of Tuan's Cabinet resigned, leaving him standing alone.

On May 18, the Peking Gazette, edited by Eugene Chen, a Chinese born and educated in England and a British subject, a brave opponent of Yuan Shih-kai and the monarchical schemes, and a staunch supporter of the republic, published an article entitled "Selling China," in which it accused the Premier of being willing to conclude with the Japanese Government an agreement which much resembled Group V of the Twenty-one Demands of 1915. That night Mr. Chen was arrested, and later, without any fair trial, he was sentenced to four months' imprisonment. The case stirred up much comment, and finally, as a result of the intercession of C. T. Wang and others, on June 4, the President pardoned him.

Meanwhile events were marching swiftly. The contest between militants and democrats was clearcut. Demands were made for Tuan's retirement from the Premiership; his military friends on the other hand urged his remaining in office. On May 19, the decision was reached in Parliament that there was a majority for war, but that the question would not be decided while Tuan was Premier. The Military Governors left on May 21 amid much speculation and some fear as to their future action. Before going they sent a petition to the President, indirectly attacking Parliament, by criticizing the Constitution which it had practically finished and asking that Parliament be dissolved if the Constitution were not corrected. The three points to which they objected were:

"1. When the House of Representatives passes a vote of lack of confidence in the Cabinet Ministers, the President shall either dismiss the Cabinet or dissolve the House of Representatives, but the said House must not be dissolved without the approval of the Senate. (The French system.)

"2. The President can appoint the Premier without the countersignature of the Cabinet Ministers.

"3. Any resolution passed by both houses shall have the same force as law."

Obviously these three points gave more power to the President and to Parliament than an autocratic Premier and his supporters would desire. The answer to this petition was an increased demand for the retirement of Tuan and the formation of a new Cabinet. The Premier refusing to resign on May 23, the President dismissed him from office. Wu Ting-fang was appointed acting Premier, and there was a feeling of relief. Li Ching-hsi, nephew of Li Hung-chang, was nominated on May 25 for Premier, and on May 28 his nomination was passed by the House of Representatives, and next day by the Senate. On May 30, C. T. Wang, Chairman of the Committee for Writing the Permanent Constitution, published a statement saying that the second reading was practically finished and reviewing the chief points of interest in the new document ready for promulgation.

The Chinese ship of state seemed to have weathered another of its many storms. But suddenly rumour came from Anhwei that General Ni Shih-chung had declared independence, and that he was backed by Chang Hsun, an unlettered "war lord" of Anhwei, and by most of the other Northern Generals and Governors, who, as Putnam Weale put it, looked upon Parliament and any Constitution it might work out as "damnable Western nonsense, the real, essential, vital, decisive instrument of Government in their eyes being not even a responsible Cabinet, but a camarilla behind that Cabinet which would typify and resume all those older forces in the country belonging to the empire and essentially militaristic and dictatorial in their character." This declaration of revolt was received without approval by the people of the country. The writer talked with men from many sections of the country, and they all agreed that the Military Governors had no definite ideal or purpose, except their own glory and power.

Fig. 5. Feng Kwo-chang. Third President of the Republic, and Staff, in Peking, Oct 10, 1917

All waited for the President to speak. His answer to this defiance came in no uncertain tones and was received by patriots with enthusiasm. Some of the more important passages in his message were:

"It is a great surprise to me that high provincial officials could have been misled by such rumours into taking arbitrary steps without considering the correctness or otherwise of the same. . . . You accuse the Cabinet of violating law, yet, with the assistance of a military force, you endeavour to disobey the orders of the Government. The only goal such acts can lead to is partition of the country like the five Chi and making the country a protectorate like Korea; in which case both restoration of the monarchy and the establishment of the republic will be an idle dream. You may not care for the black records that will be written against you in history, but you ought certainly to realize your own fate. . . .

"I am an old man. Like the beanstalk under the leaf I have always been watching for any possibility of not seeing and understanding aright. Yea, I walk day and night as if treading on thin ice. I welcome all for giving me advice and even admonition. If it will benefit the country, I am ready to apologize.

"But if it be your aim to shake the foundations of the country and provoke internal war, I declare that I am not afraid to die for the country. I have passed through the fire of trial and have exhausted my strength and energy from the beginning to the end for the republic. I have nothing to be ashamed of. I will under no circumstance watch my country sink into perdition, still less subject myself to become a slave to another race.

"Of such acts I wash my hands in front of all the elders of the country. These are sincere words from my true heart and will be carried out into deeds.

"LI YUAN-HUNG." May 31, 1917.

Following the declaration of independence of the northern provinces, most of the southern ones declared their opposition to this stand. They were led by Yunnan, Kweichow, Kwantung, and Kwangsi, who originally opposed the monarchical movement of Yuan Shih-kai in 1916. Some of the loyal Generals' telegrams were hotly worded. From Tang Chi-yao, Governor of Yunnan:

"Chi-yao is unpolished in thoughts and ignorant of the ways of partisanship or factionism. All he cares and knows about is to protect the republic and be loyal to it. If any one should be daring enough to endanger the Chief Executive or Parliament, I vow I shall not live with him under the same sky. I shall mount my steed the moment order is received from the President to do so."

From a General in Kwantung:

"The reason why the rebels have risen against the Government is that they are fighting for their own posts and for money. That is why their views are so divergent and their acts so ill-balanced. It is hoped the President will be firm to the very last and give no ear either to threat or inducement. This is the time for us to sweep away the remnants of the monarchist curse and reform the administration. With my head leaning against the spear I wait for the order to strike and I will not hesitate even if I should return to my native place a corpse wrapped up in horse-skin!"

The military party nevertheless met at Tientsin and elected Hsu Shih-chang, Generalissimo. But soon signs of dissension appeared among them. On June 7 was made public a friendly warning from America. The American Minister, Dr. Reinsch, transmitted the following message to Dr. Wu Ting-fang, the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

"The Government of the United States learns with the most profound regret of the dissension in China and desires to express the most sincere desire that tranquillity and political c